Communicating sequential processes
Communicating sequential processes
Composition and integrity preservation of secure reactive systems
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Communications of the ACM
Protecting privacy using the decentralized label model
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Distributed Algorithms
Semantics and Program Analysis of Computationally Secure Information Flow
ESOP '01 Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems
Unwinding Possibilistic Security Properties
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Computational Probabilistic Non-interference
ESORICS '02 Proceedings of the 7th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Secrecy Types for Asymmetric Communication
FoSSaCS '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures
Information Flow Control and Applications - Bridging a Gap
FME '01 Proceedings of the International Symposium of Formal Methods Europe on Formal Methods for Increasing Software Productivity
A Uniform Approach for the Definition of Security Properties
FM '99 Proceedings of the Wold Congress on Formal Methods in the Development of Computing Systems-Volume I - Volume I
Verification of a Formal Security Model for Multiapplicative Smart Cards
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
What is Intransitive Noninterference?
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Secure Introduction of One-Way Functions
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Absorbing covers and intransitive non-interference
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A general theory of security properties
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Relating cryptography and formal methods: a panel
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Relating Symbolic and Cryptographic Secrecy
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Non-Interference Control Synthesis for Security Timed Automata
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
The reactive simulatability (RSIM) framework for asynchronous systems
Information and Computation
Declassification: Dimensions and principles
Journal of Computer Security - 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 18)
Justifying a dolev-yao model under active attacks
Foundations of Security Analysis and Design III
Quantifying probabilistic information flow in computational reactive systems
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Formal methods and cryptography
FM'06 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Formal Methods
Conditional information flow policies and unwinding relations
TGC'11 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Trustworthy Global Computing
Intransitive noninterference in nondeterministic systems
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Information flow and non-interference have recentlybecome very popular concepts for expressing both integrityand privacy properties. Because of the enormouspotential of transmitting information using probabilisticmethods of cryptography, interest arose in capturingprobabilistic non-interference. We investigate the notionof intransitive probabilistic non-interference in reactivesystems, i.e., downgrading of probabilistic informationand detection of probabilistic information flowby one or more involved third parties. Based on concreteexamples, we derive several definitions that comprisecryptography-related details like error probabilities andcomputational restrictions. This makes the definitionsapplicable to systems involving real cryptography. Detectionof probabilistic information flow is significantlymore complicated to define if several third parties areinvolved because of the possibilities of secret sharing.We solve this problem by graph-theoretic techniques.