A behavioral notion of subtyping
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Role-Based Access Control Models
Computer
Proposed NIST standard for role-based access control
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Information Flow Control and Applications - Bridging a Gap
FME '01 Proceedings of the International Symposium of Formal Methods Europe on Formal Methods for Increasing Software Productivity
A verification approach to applied system security
International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer (STTT) - Special section on formal methods for industrial critical systems
Model driven security: From UML models to access control infrastructures
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
Secure Systems Development with UML
Secure Systems Development with UML
An aspect-oriented methodology for designing secure applications
Information and Software Technology
From Access Control Policies to an Aspect-Based Infrastructure: A Metamodel-Based Approach
Models in Software Engineering
Extending access control models with break-glass
Proceedings of the 14th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
SecureBPMN: modeling and enforcing access control requirements in business processes
Proceedings of the 17th ACM symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies
Software and Systems Modeling (SoSyM)
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SecureUML is a security modeling language for formalizing access control requirements in a declarative way. It is equipped with a uml notation in terms of a uml profile, and can be combined with arbitrary design modeling languages. We present a semantics for SecureUML in terms of a model transformation to standard uml/ocl. The transformation scheme is used as part of an implementation of a tool chain ranging from front-end visual modeling tools over code-generators to the interactive theorem proving environment hol-ocl. The methodological consequences for an analysis of the generated ocl formulae are discussed.