The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
A Per Model of Secure Information Flow in Sequential Programs
ESOP '99 Proceedings of the 8th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems
Information Flow Control and Applications - Bridging a Gap
FME '01 Proceedings of the International Symposium of Formal Methods Europe on Formal Methods for Increasing Software Productivity
Modular verification of static class invariants
FM'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Formal Methods
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This contribution discusses two main lines of developments concerning the use of formal methods in security engineering. Fully automated and highly specialized methods that hide most of the formal theory from its users are compared to formal security models centered around explicit formal system models. It is argued that only the latter offer the perspective to comprehensively control the development process with its various security aspects and phases. In putting more emphasis on the combination of theories, fragmentation could be overcome by an integration of the specialized methods that are presently still applied in isolation.