Modal logics for mobile processes
Selected papers of the 3rd workshop on Concurrency and compositionality
Secure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative language
POPL '98 Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
The SLam calculus: programming with secrecy and integrity
POPL '98 Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
An Axiomatic Approach to Information Flow in Programs
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Communication and Concurrency
Secure Information Flow as Typed Process Behaviour
ESOP '00 Proceedings of the 9th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems
Secrecy by Typing inSecurity Protocols
TACS '97 Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
Non-Interference Through Determinism
ESORICS '94 Proceedings of the Third European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Control Flow Analysis for the pi-calculus
CONCUR '98 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
CONCUR '96 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
On Asynchronous Communication Semantics
ECOOP '91 Proceedings of the Workshop on Object-Based Concurrent Computing
Testing Theories for Asynchronous Languages
Proceedings of the 18th Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
Process Algebra and Non-interference
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Typed Process Calculus for Fine-Grained Resource Access Control in Distributed Computation
TACS '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
TACS '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
Classification of Security Properties (Part I: Information Flow)
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
Reasoning about Security in Mobile Ambients
CONCUR '01 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Secrecy Types for Asymmetric Communication
FoSSaCS '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures
FoSSaCS '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures
Securing Communication in a Concurrent Language
SAS '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Static Analysis
Noninterference for Concurrent Programs
ICALP '01 Proceedings of the 28th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming,
A Simple View of Type-Secure Information Flow in the "-Calculus
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Non-disclosure for distributed mobile code
FSTTCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
Security boundaries in mobile ambients
Computer Languages, Systems and Structures
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We propose an extension of the asychronous π-calculus in which a variety of security properties may be captured using types. These are an extension of the Input/Output types for the π-calculus in which I/O capabilities are assigned specific security levels. We define a typing system which ensures that processes running at security level σ cannot access resources with a security level higher than σ. The notion of access control guaranteed by this system is formalized in terms of a Type Safety theorem. We then show that, for a certain class of processes, our system prohibits implicit information flow from high-level to low-level processes. We prove that low-level behaviour can not be influenced by changes to high-level behaviour. This is formalized as a Non-Interference Theorem with respect to may testing.