A Simple View of Type-Secure Information Flow in the "-Calculus

  • Authors:
  • François Pottier

  • Affiliations:
  • -

  • Venue:
  • CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

One way of enforcing an information flow control policy is to use a static type system capable of guaranteeing a noninterference property. Noninterference requires that two processes with distinct "high"-level components, but common "low"-level structure, cannot be distinguished by "low"-level observers. We state this property in terms of a rather strict notion of process equivalence, namely weak barbed reduction congruence.Because noninterference is not a safety property, it is often regarded as more difficult to establish than a conventional type safety result. This paper aims to provide an elementary noninterference roof in the setting of the 驴 calculus. This is done by reducing the problem to subject reduction "a safety property" for a nonstandard, but fairly natural, extension of the 驴 calculus, baptized the (驴)-calculus.