Secure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative language
POPL '98 Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
The SLam calculus: programming with secrecy and integrity
POPL '98 Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A sound type system for secure flow analysis
Journal of Computer Security
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
A uniform type structure for secure information flow
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Information flow inference for ML
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
PI-Calculus: A Theory of Mobile Processes
PI-Calculus: A Theory of Mobile Processes
Information flow vs. resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Secure Information Flow as Typed Process Behaviour
ESOP '00 Proceedings of the 9th European Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems
Classification of Security Properties (Part I: Information Flow)
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
FoSSaCS '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures
Bisimulation in Name-Passing Calculi without Matching
LICS '98 Proceedings of the 13th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Simple View of Type-Secure Information Flow in the "-Calculus
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Information Flow Security in Dynamic Contexts
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Modelling Downgrading in Information Flow Security
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Typed behavioural equivalences for processes in the presence of subtyping
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science
Verifying persistent security properties
Computer Languages, Systems and Structures
P-congruences as non-interference for the pi-calculus
Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Formal methods in security
Controlling information release in the π-calculus
Information and Computation
State-oriented Noninterference for CCS
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
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We develop a theory of noninterference for a typed version of the π-calculus where types are used to assign secrecy levels to channels. We provide two equivalent characterizations of noninterference based on a typed behavioural equivalence relative to a security level σ, which captures the idea of external observers of level σ. The first characterization involves a universal quantification over all the possible active attacks, i.e., malicious processes which interact with the system possibly leaking secret information. The second definition of noninterference is expressed in terms of an unwinding condition, which deals with so-called passive attacks trying to infer confidential information just by observing the behaviour of the system. This unwinding-based characterization naturally leads to efficient methods for the verification and construction of (compositional) secure systems. Furthermore, we characterize noninterference in terms of bisimulation-like (partial) equivalence relations in the style of a stream of similar studies for other process calculi (e.g., CCS and CryptoSPA) and languages (e.g., imperative and multi-threaded languages).