Process algebra and non-interference
Journal of Computer Security
A uniform type structure for secure information flow
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
PI-Calculus: A Theory of Mobile Processes
PI-Calculus: A Theory of Mobile Processes
Information flow vs. resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Classification of Security Properties (Part I: Information Flow)
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
Securing Communication in a Concurrent Language
SAS '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Static Analysis
Bisimulation in Name-Passing Calculi without Matching
LICS '98 Proceedings of the 13th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
What is Intransitive Noninterference?
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Simple View of Type-Secure Information Flow in the "-Calculus
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Information Flow Security in Dynamic Contexts
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Modelling Downgrading in Information Flow Security
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Typed behavioural equivalences for processes in the presence of subtyping
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science
Dimensions and Principles of Declassification
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Secrecy despite compromise: types, cryptography, and the pi-calculus
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
A theory of noninterference for the π-calculus
TGC'05 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Verifying persistent security properties
Computer Languages, Systems and Structures
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
A calculus of trustworthy ad hoc networks
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
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We introduce a notion of controlled information release for a typed version of the @p-calculus extended with declassification primitives; this property scales to noninterference when downgrading is not allowed. We provide various characterizations of controlled release, based on a typed behavioural equivalence relative to a security level @s, which captures the idea of external observers of level @s. First, we define our security property through a universal quantification over all the possible active attackers, i.e., malicious processes which interact with the system possibly leaking secret information. Then we characterize the controlled release property in terms of an unwinding condition, which deals with so-called passive attackers trying to infer confidential information just by observing the behaviour of the system. Furthermore, we express controlled information release in terms of partial equivalence relations (per models, for short) in the style of a stream of similar studies for imperative and multi-threaded languages. We show that the controlled release property is compositional with respect to most operators of the language leading to efficient proof techniques for the verification and the construction of (compositional) secure systems.