The framework of selective interleaving functions and the modular assembly kit
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Enforcing robust declassification and qualified robustness
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW17
P-congruences as non-interference for the pi-calculus
Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Formal methods in security
Localized delimited release: combining the what and where dimensions of information release
Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Non-Interference Control Synthesis for Security Timed Automata
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Controlling information release in the π-calculus
Information and Computation
Action Refinement in Process Algebra and Security Issues
Logic-Based Program Synthesis and Transformation
Declassification: Dimensions and principles
Journal of Computer Security - 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 18)
On declassification and the non-disclosure policy
Journal of Computer Security - 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 18)
A theory of noninterference for the π-calculus
TGC'05 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Trustworthy global computing
On intransitive non-interference in some models of concurrency
Foundations of security analysis and design VI
Admissible interference by typing for cryptographic protocols
ICICS'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Conditional information flow policies and unwinding relations
TGC'11 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Trustworthy Global Computing
Intransitive noninterference in nondeterministic systems
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
What, indeed, is intransitive noninterference?
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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Information flow security properties such as noninterferenceensure the protection of confidential data by stronglylimiting the flow of sensitive information. However, to dealwith real applications, it is often necessary to admit mechanismsfor downgrading or declassifying information.In this paper we propose a general unwinding frameworkfor formalizing different noninterference properties permittingdowngrading, i.e., allowing information to flow froma higher to a lower security level through a downgrader.The framework is parametric with respect to the observationequivalence used to discriminate between different processbehaviours. We prove general compositionality propertiesand provide conditions under which both horizontaland vertical refinements are preserved under all the securityproperties obtained as instances of the unwinding framework.Finally, we present a decision procedure to check oursecurity properties and prove some complexity results.