On reduction-based process semantics
Selected papers of the thirteenth conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
Process algebra and non-interference
Journal of Computer Security
A uniform type structure for secure information flow
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
PI-Calculus: A Theory of Mobile Processes
PI-Calculus: A Theory of Mobile Processes
Information flow vs. resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
FoSSaCS '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures
Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Simple View of Type-Secure Information Flow in the "-Calculus
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Information Flow Security in Dynamic Contexts
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Modelling Downgrading in Information Flow Security
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Typed behavioural equivalences for processes in the presence of subtyping
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science
Dimensions and Principles of Declassification
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Secrecy despite compromise: types, cryptography, and the pi-calculus
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Type-based information flow analysis for the π-calculus
Acta Informatica - Special issue: Types in concurrency. Part II , Guest Editor: R. De Nicola, D. Sangiorgi
A theory of noninterference for the π-calculus
TGC'05 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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We introduce a notion of noninterference for a typed version of the π-calculus where types are used to assign secrecy levels to channels. Noninterference is expressed in terms of a partial congruence(p-congruence, for short). We provide a proof technique in the form of a bisimulation-like partial equivalence relation that is a binary relation which is symmetric and transitive but not reflexive.We show that the noninterference property is compositional with respect to most of the operators of the language leading to efficient proof techniques for the verification and the construction of (compositional) secure systems.In order to allow downgrading of sensitive information, we extend the π-calculus with declassification primitives and we study a property which scales to noninterference when downgrading is not permitted.