A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secrecy by typing in security protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A uniform type structure for secure information flow
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Information flow vs. resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Classification of Security Properties (Part I: Information Flow)
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
On Asynchronous Communication Semantics
ECOOP '91 Proceedings of the Workshop on Object-Based Concurrent Computing
From type theory to the verification of security protocols
From type theory to the verification of security protocols
Abstract non-interference: parameterizing non-interference by abstract interpretation
Proceedings of the 31st ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Enforcing Robust Declassification
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Modelling Downgrading in Information Flow Security
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Many security properties of cryptographic protocols can be expressed by using information flow policies as non-interference. But, in general it is very difficult to design a system without interference. For that, many works try to weak the standard definition of the non-interference. For instance, in [21] Mullins defines the admissible interference as an interference that admits flow information only through a dowgrader. Thus, we present in this paper a type system that try to detect process that allow interference. Then, if we can type a process we can say that is free interference. Also, we extend the type system of process with another type system based on a standard message algebra used in the literature of cryptographic protocols. So, we define the theoric characterization, prove the correctness of our type system and present an illustration of our result.