An executable model for security protocol JFKr

Authors:
David L. Rager
Affiliations:
The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX
Venue:
Proceedings of the Eighth International Workshop on the ACL2 Theorem Prover and its Applications
Year:
2009

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Abstract

JFKr is a security protocol that establishes a shared encryption key between two participants. This paper briefly describes the different components of JFKr and the security property each component is intended to provide. It then describes an executable model, interleaving pieces of code to help the reader understand how the model represents the protocol specification. Finally, it presents some theorems about the model. The contributions of this work include (1) an executable model for a key establishment protocol about which we can reason, (2) a model for an attacker that permits the injection, modification, and removal of messages between the participants, and (3) formalizations of a subset of desired security properties.