Finite-state analysis of two contract signing protocols
Theoretical Computer Science
A Meta-Notation for Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Logics for Reasoning about Cryptographic Constructions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A compositional logic for proving security properties of protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
Abstraction and Refinement in Protocol Derivation
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Multiset rewriting and the complexity of bounded security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Analysis of the 802.11i 4-way handshake
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Compositional Analysis of Contract Signing Protocols
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Computational and Information-Theoretic Soundness and Completeness of Formal Encryption
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Computational soundness for standard assumptions of formal cryptography
Computational soundness for standard assumptions of formal cryptography
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Finite-state analysis of SSL 3.0
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security logic
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Computationally sound, automated proofs for security protocols
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Implementation and performance evaluation of the RSEP protocol on ARM and intel platforms
Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security of information and networks
CSR'07 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Computer Science: theory and applications
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Security analysis of network protocols is a rich scientific area with two different foundations, one based on logic and symbolic computation, and one based on computational complexity theory. The symbolic approach has led to formal logics and automated tools that have been used successfully in a number of case studies. The computational approach yields more insight into the strength and vulnerabilities of protocols, but it involves explicit reasoning about probability and computational complexity. Ideally, we would like to combine the advantages of both and develop a simple, automatable method that captures intuitive high-level reasoning principles, yet accurately reflects the subtleties of probabilistic polynomial-time computation. This talk will summarize some of the main lines of prior work and discuss ways to bridge the gap between symbolic and computational analysis. A significant portion of the talk will focus on a high-level protocol logic whose provable statements are correct when regarded as assertions about probabilistic polynomial-time protocol execution in the face of probabilistic polynomial-time attack.