Security analysis of network protocols: logical and computational methods
PPDP '05 Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGPLAN international conference on Principles and practice of declarative programming
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security logic
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
A cryptographic model for branching time security properties: the case of contract signing protocols
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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We develop a general method for reasoning about contract-signing protocols using a specialized protocol logic. The method is applied to prove properties of the Asokan-Shoup-Waidner and theGaray-Jacobson-MacKenzie protocols. Our method offers certain advantages over previous analysis techniques. First, it is compositional: the security guarantees are proved by combining the independent proofs for the three sub-protocols of which each protocol is comprised. Second, the formal proofs are carried out in a "template" form, which gives us a reusable proof that may be instantiated for the ASW and GJM protocols, as well as for other protocols with the same arrangement of messages. Third, the proofs follow the design intuition. In particular, in proving game-theoretic properties like fairness, we demonstrate that the specific strategy that the protocol designer had in mind works, instead of showing that one exists. Finally, our results hold even when an unbounded number of sessions are executed in parallel.