Efficient and timely mutual authentication
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A lesson on authentication protocol design
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Authenticated group key agreement and friends
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Towards a completeness result for model checking of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
A Bound on Attacks on Authentication Protocols
TCS '02 Proceedings of the IFIP 17th World Computer Congress - TC1 Stream / 2nd IFIP International Conference on Theoretical Computer Science: Foundations of Information Technology in the Era of Networking and Mobile Computing
A Security Analysis of the Cliques Protocols Suites
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Some attacks upon authenticated group key agreement protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
Abstraction and Refinement in Protocol Derivation
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
New multiparty authentication services and key agreement protocols
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Proving Group Protocols Secure Against Eavesdroppers
IJCAR '08 Proceedings of the 4th international joint conference on Automated Reasoning
On the (im)possibility of perennial message recognition protocols without public-key cryptography
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Protocol analysis in Maude-NPA using unification modulo homomorphic encryption
Proceedings of the 13th international ACM SIGPLAN symposium on Principles and practices of declarative programming
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The A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2 authenticated group key agreement protocols showed to be flawed in 2001. Even though the corresponding attacks (or some variants of them) have been rediscovered in several different frameworks, no fixed version of these protocols has been proposed until now.In this paper, we prove that it is in fact impossible to design a scalable authenticated group key agreement protocol based on the same design assumptions as the A-GDH ones. We proceed by providing a systematic way to derive an attack against any A-GDH-type protocol with at least four participants and exhibit protocols with two and three participants which we cannot break using our technique. As far as we know, this is the first generic insecurity result reported in the literature concerning authentication protocols.