Temporal verification of reactive systems: safety
Temporal verification of reactive systems: safety
Inductive methods and contract-signing protocols
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Finite-state analysis of two contract signing protocols
Theoretical Computer Science
A Multi-party Optimistic Non-repudiation Protocol
ICISC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Optimistic Fair Exchange with Transparent Signature Recovery
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Game Analysis of Abuse-free Contract Signing
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Compositional Logic for Protocol Correctness
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A compositional logic for proving security properties of protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
Formal Analysis of Multi-Party Contract Signing
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Abstraction and Refinement in Protocol Derivation
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
A modular correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security logic
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
An intensive survey of fair non-repudiation protocols
Computer Communications
A framework for compositional verification of security protocols
Information and Computation
The layered games framework for specifications and analysis of security protocols
International Journal of Applied Cryptography
The layered games framework for specifications and analysis of security protocols
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Computationally sound analysis of a probabilistic contract signing protocol
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Component-oriented verification of noninterference
Journal of Systems Architecture: the EUROMICRO Journal
Usable optimistic fair exchange
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Usable optimistic fair exchange
CT-RSA'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
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We develop a general method for proving properties of contract-signing protocols using a specialized protocol logic. The method is applied to the Asokan-Shoup--Waidner and the Garay-Jacobson-MacKenzie protocols. Our method offers certain advantages over previous analysis techniques. First, it is compositional: the security guarantees are proved by combining the independent proofs for the three subprotocols of each protocol. Second, the formal proofs are carried out in a "template" form, which gives us a reusable proof that may he instantiated for the two example protocols, as well as for other protocols with the same arrangement of messages. Third, the proofs follow the design intuition. In particular, in proving game-theoretic properties like fairness, we demonstrate success for the specific strategy that the protocol designer had in mind, instead of non-constructively proving that a strategy exists. Finally, our logical proofs demonstrate security when an unbounded number of sessions are executed in parallel.