Compositional analysis of contract-signing protocols
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Fair multi-party contract signing using private contract signatures
Information and Computation
The CASPA Tool: Causality-Based Abstraction for Security Protocol Analysis
CAV '08 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Multiparty nonrepudiation: A survey
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
A new fair non-repudiation protocol for secure negotiation and contract signing
Proceedings of the 2006 International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust: Bridge the Gap Between PST Technologies and Business Services
Deciding strategy properties of contract-signing protocols
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL)
Improved multi-party contract signing
FC'07/USEC'07 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Financial cryptography and 1st International conference on Usable Security
Analysis of a receipt-free auction protocol in the applied pi calculus
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
A dolev-yao-based definition of abuse-free protocols
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Deciding properties of contract-signing protocols
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Analysis of an electronic voting protocol in the applied pi calculus
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We analyze the multi-party contract-signing protocolsof Garay and MacKenzie (GM) and of Baum and Waidner(BW). We use a finite-state tool, MOCHA, which allowsspecification of protocol properties in a branching-timetemporal logic with game semantics. While our analysisdoes not reveal any errors in the BW protocol, in the GMprotocol we discover serious problems with fairness for foursigners and an oversight regarding abuse-freeness for threesigners. We propose a complete revision of the GM subprotocolsin order to restore fairness.