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ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
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Information and Computation
Reachability Analysis of Term Rewriting Systems with Timbuk
LPAR '01 Proceedings of the Artificial Intelligence on Logic for Programming
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
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CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Formal Analysis of Multi-Party Contract Signing
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Static validation of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Causality-based Abstraction of Multiplicity in Security Protocols
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Verification of cryptographic Protocols: tagging enforces termination
FOSSACS'03/ETAPS'03 Proceedings of the 6th International conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures and joint European conference on Theory and practice of software
Searching for shapes in cryptographic protocols
TACAS'07 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Tools and algorithms for the construction and analysis of systems
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
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RTA'06 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Term Rewriting and Applications
Journal of Computer Security - Foundational Aspects of Security
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CASPAconstitutes a push-button tool for automatically proving secrecy and authenticity properties of cryptographic protocols. The tool is grounded on a novel technique for causality-based abstraction of protocol executions that allows establishing proofs of security for an unbounded number of concurrent protocol executions in an automated manner. We demonstrate the expressiveness and efficiency of the tool by drawing a comparison with T4ASP, the static analyzer for secrecy properties offered by the AVISPA tool. CASPAis capable of coping with a substantially larger set of protocols, and excels in performance.