Authentication tests and the structure of bundles
Theoretical Computer Science
Protocol Independence through Disjoint Encryption
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
How to Prevent Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Multiset rewriting and the complexity of bounded security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Relating Symbolic and Cryptographic Secrecy
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Adding Branching to the Strand Space Model
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Searching for shapes in cryptographic protocols
TACAS'07 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Tools and algorithms for the construction and analysis of systems
Safely composing security protocols
FSTTCS'07 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
Programming cryptographic protocols
TGC'05 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Universally composable symbolic analysis of mutual authentication and key-exchange protocols
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Completeness of the authentication tests
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Understanding abstractions of secure channels
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Distributed temporal logic for the analysis of security protocol models
Theoretical Computer Science
State and Progress in Strand Spaces: Proving Fair Exchange
Journal of Automated Reasoning
A sound decision procedure for the compositionality of secrecy
ESSoS'12 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Engineering Secure Software and Systems
Security goals and protocol transformations
TOSCA'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Theory of Security and Applications
Establishing and preserving protocol security goals
Journal of Computer Security - Foundational Aspects of Security
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Although cryptographic protocols are typically analyzed in isolation, they are used in combinations. If a protocol *** 1 , when analyzed alone, was shown to meet some security goals, will it still meet those goals when executed together with a second protocol *** 2 ? Not necessarily: for every *** 1 , some *** 2 s undermine its goals. We use the strand space "authentication test" principles to suggest a criterion to ensure a *** 2 preserves *** 1 's goals; this criterion strengthens previous proposals. Security goals for *** 1 are expressed in a language $\mathcal{L}$(*** 1 ) in classical logic. Strand spaces provide the models for $\mathcal{L}$(*** 1 ). Certain homomorphisms among models for $\mathcal{L}$(*** ) preserve the truth of the security goals. This gives a way to extract--from a counterexample to a goal that uses both protocols--a counterexample using only the first protocol. This model-theoretic technique, using homomorphisms among models to prove results about a syntactically defined set of formulas, appears to be novel for protocol analysis.