The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Authentication tests and the structure of bundles
Theoretical Computer Science
Security Goals: Packet Trajectories and Strand Spaces
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Multiset rewriting and the complexity of bounded security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Types and effects for asymmetric cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Searching for shapes in cryptographic protocols
TACAS'07 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Tools and algorithms for the construction and analysis of systems
Pattern-based abstraction for verifying secrecy in protocols
TACAS'03 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Tools and algorithms for the construction and analysis of systems
On the security of public key protocols
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Rewriting Techniques in the Constraint Solver
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Cryptographic Protocol Composition via the Authentication Tests
FOSSACS '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
How to do things with cryptographic protocols
ASIAN'07 Proceedings of the 12th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: computer and network security
Analysing TLS in the strand spaces model
Journal of Computer Security
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Protocol participants manipulate values, transforming the cryptographic contexts in which they occur. The rules of the protocol determine which transformations are permitted. We formalize these transformations, obtaining new versions of the two authentication tests from earlier strand space papers. We prove that the new versions are complete, in this sense: any collection of behaviors that satisfies those two authentication tests, when combined with some feasible adversary behavior, yields a possible execution. We illustrate the strengthened authentication tests with brief analyses of three protocols.