An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
Information Processing Letters
An approach to the formal verification of cryptographic protocols
CCS '96 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
A Method for Automatic Cryptographic Protocol Verification
IPDPS '00 Proceedings of the 15 IPDPS 2000 Workshops on Parallel and Distributed Processing
Secrecy by Typing inSecurity Protocols
TACS '97 Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification
CADE-17 Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Automated Deduction
Honest Ideals on Strand Spaces
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Invariant Generation Techniques in Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Protocol Insecurity with Finite Number of Sessions is NP-Complete
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Authenticity by Typing for Security Protocols
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Security properties: two agents are sufficient
Science of Computer Programming - Special issue on 12th European symposium on programming (ESOP 2003)
Handling Left-Quadratic Rules When Completing Tree Automata
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
SPVT-II: An Efficient Security Protocol Verifier Based on Logic Programming
Information Security and Cryptology
Tree Automata for Detecting Attacks on Protocols with Algebraic Cryptographic Primitives
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Security properties: two agents are sufficient
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
Integrating verification, testing, and learning for cryptographic protocols
IFM'07 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Integrated formal methods
An abstraction and refinement framework for verifying security protocols based on logic programming
ASIAN'07 Proceedings of the 12th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: computer and network security
Completeness of the authentication tests
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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We present a method based on abstract interpretation for verifying secrecy properties of cryptographic protocols. Our method allows to verify secrecy properties in a general model allowing an unbounded number of sessions, an unbounded number of principals and an unbounded size of messages. As abstract domain we use sets of so-called pattern terms, that is, terms with an interpreted constructor, Sup, where a term Sup (t) is meant for the set of terms that contain t as sub-term.We implemented a prototype and were able to verify well-known protocols such as for instance Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (0.02 sec), Yahalom (12.67 sec), Otway-Rees (0.02 sec), Skeme (0.06 sec) and Kao-Chow (0.07 sec).