Tree Automata for Detecting Attacks on Protocols with Algebraic Cryptographic Primitives

  • Authors:
  • Yohan Boichut;Pierre-Cyrille Héam;Olga Kouchnarenko

  • Affiliations:
  • Laboratoire d'Informatique Fondamentale d'Orléans, Université d'Orléans, France;LSV CNRS / INRIA / ENS Cachan, Cachan, France;INRIA-CASSIS, LIFC, Besançon, France

  • Venue:
  • Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

This paper extends a rewriting approximations-based theoretical framework in which the security problem - secrecy preservation against an active intruder - may be semi-decided through a reachability analysis. In a recent paper, we have shown how to semi-decide whether a security protocol using algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives is safe. In this paper, we investigate the dual - insecurity - problem: we explain how to semi-decide whether a protocol using cryptographic primitive algebraic properties is unsafe. This improvement offers us to draw automatically a complete diagnostic of a security protocol with an unbounded number of sessions. Furthermore, our approach is supported by the tool TA4SP successfully applied for analysing the NSPK-xor protocol and the Diffie-Hellman protocol.