Conditional rewriting logic as a unified model of concurrency
Selected papers of the Second Workshop on Concurrency and compositionality
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
Maude: specification and programming in rewriting logic
Theoretical Computer Science - Rewriting logic and its applications
Canonical Forms and Unification
Proceedings of the 5th Conference on Automated Deduction
Decidable Matching for Convergent Systems (Preliminary Version)
CADE-11 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Automated Deduction: Automated Deduction
How to Prevent Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Analyzing Protocols that use Modular Exponentiation: Semantic Unification
Analyzing Protocols that use Modular Exponentiation: Semantic Unification
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on ACM conference on computer and communications security, 2001
A rewriting-based inference system for the NRL Protocol analyzer and its meta-logical properties
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
LPAR'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Formal characterization and automated analysis of known-pair and chosen-text attacks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
State Space Reduction in the Maude-NRL Protocol Analyzer
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Tree Automata for Detecting Attacks on Protocols with Algebraic Cryptographic Primitives
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Variant Narrowing and Equational Unification
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Automatic verification of correspondences for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Automated deduction for verification
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Approximation-based tree regular model-checking
Nordic Journal of Computing
All about maude - a high-performance logical framework: how to specify, program and verify systems in rewriting logic
Order-sorted Equational Unification Revisited
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
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The NRL Protocol Analyzer (NPA) is a tool for the formal specification and analysis of cryptographic protocols that has been used with great effect on a number of complex real-life protocols. One of the most interesting of its features is that it can be used to reason about security in face of attempted attacks on low-level algebraic properties of the functions used in a protocol. Recently, we have given for the first time a precise formal specification of the main features of the NPA inference system: its grammar-based techniques for (co-)invariant generation and its backwards narrowing reachability analysis method; both implemented in Maude as the Maude-NPA tool. This formal specification is given within the well-known rewriting framework so that the inference system is specified as a set of rewrite rules modulo an equational theory describing the behavior of the cryptographic symbols involved. This paper gives a high-level overview of the Maude-NPA tool and illustrates how it supports equational reasoning about properties of the underlying cryptographic infrastructure by means of a simple, yet nontrivial, example of an attack whose discovery essentially requires equational reasoning. It also shows how rule-based programming languages such as Maude and complex narrowing strategies are useful to model, analyze, and verify protocols.