Communications of the ACM
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Inference of Reversible Languages
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Casper: a compiler for the analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Model Checking of Safety Properties
Formal Methods in System Design
Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification
CADE-17 Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Automated Deduction
Abstracting cryptographic protocols with tree automata
Science of Computer Programming - Special issue on static analysis (SAS'99)
Provable Implementations of Security Protocols
LICS '06 Proceedings of the 21st Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
On the security of public key protocols
SFCS '81 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
RTA'03 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Rewriting techniques and applications
Pattern-based abstraction for verifying secrecy in protocols
TACAS'03 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Tools and algorithms for the construction and analysis of systems
Cryptographic protocol analysis on real c code
VMCAI'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Model-based Security Testing Using UMLsec
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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The verification of cryptographic protocol specifications is an active research topic and has received much attention from the formal verification community. By contrast, the black-box testing of actual implementations of protocols, which is, arguably, as important as verification for ensuring the correct functioning of protocols in the "real" world, is little studied. We propose an approach for checking secrecy and authenticity properties not only on protocol specifications, but also on black-box implementations. The approach is compositional and integrates ideas from verification, testing, and learning. It is illustrated on the Basic Access Control protocol implemented in biometric passports.