STOC '91 Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A semantics for a logic of authentication (extended abstract)
PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Handbook of theoretical computer science (vol. B)
Abstract interpretation and application to logic programs
Journal of Logic Programming
Adding time to a logic of authentication
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Provably secure session key distribution: the three party case
STOC '95 Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Secrecy by typing in security protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Model checking
A Method for Automatic Cryptographic Protocol Verification
IPDPS '00 Proceedings of the 15 IPDPS 2000 Workshops on Parallel and Distributed Processing
Secrecy by Typing inSecurity Protocols
TACS '97 Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Reasoning about Cryptographic Protocols in the Spi Calculus
CONCUR '97 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Decidable Approximations of Sets of Descendants and Sets of Normal Forms
RTA '98 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Rewriting Techniques and Applications
Automatic Verification of Cryptographic Protocols with SETHEO
CADE-14 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Automated Deduction
Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification
CADE-17 Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Automated Deduction
Towards a Completeness Result for Model Checking of Security Protocols
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Decision Procedures for the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols by Logics of Belief
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Meta-Notation for Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
On Unifying Some Cryptographic Protocol Logics
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Fast, automatic checking of security protocols
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
Extrapolating Tree Transformations
CAV '02 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Abstract Regular Tree Model Checking
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Integrating verification, testing, and learning for cryptographic protocols
IFM'07 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Integrated formal methods
Security protocols: principles and calculi tutorial notes
Foundations of security analysis and design IV
Techniques for scaling up analyses based on pre-interpretations
ICLP'05 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Logic Programming
Handling exp, χ (and timestamps) in protocol analysis
FOSSACS'06 Proceedings of the 9th European joint conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures
Abstract interpretation-based verification of non-functional requirements
COORDINATION'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Coordination Models and Languages
Security protocol verification: symbolic and computational models
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
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Cryptographic protocols have so far been analyzed for the most part by means of testing (which does not yield proofs of secrecy) and theorem proving (costly). We propose a new approach, based on abstract interpretation and using regular tree languages. The abstraction we use seems fine-grained enough to be able to certify some protocols. Both the concrete and abstract semantics of the protocol description language and implementation issues are discussed in the paper.