Abstracting cryptographic protocols with tree automata

  • Authors:
  • David Monniaux

  • Affiliations:
  • Laboratoire d'Informatique, École Normale Supérieure, 45 rue d'Ulm, 75230 Paris cédex 5, France

  • Venue:
  • Science of Computer Programming - Special issue on static analysis (SAS'99)
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

Cryptographic protocols have so far been analyzed for the most part by means of testing (which does not yield proofs of secrecy) and theorem proving (costly). We propose a new approach, based on abstract interpretation and using regular tree languages. The abstraction we use seems fine-grained enough to be able to certify some protocols. Both the concrete and abstract semantics of the protocol description language and implementation issues are discussed in the paper.