Conditional rewriting logic as a unified model of concurrency
Selected papers of the Second Workshop on Concurrency and compositionality
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification
CADE-17 Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Automated Deduction
Abstracting cryptographic protocols with tree automata
Science of Computer Programming - Special issue on static analysis (SAS'99)
Relating Strands and Multiset Rewriting for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Reachability Analysis over Term Rewriting Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Automated Verification of Selected Equivalences for Security Protocols
LICS '05 Proceedings of the 20th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Control Flow Analysis for the Applied π--calculus
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Symbolic protocol analysis for monoidal equational theories
Information and Computation
Certifying a Tree Automata Completion Checker
IJCAR '08 Proceedings of the 4th international joint conference on Automated Reasoning
Approximation-based tree regular model-checking
Nordic Journal of Computing
SENSORIA process calculi for service-oriented computing
TGC'06 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Trustworthy global computing
Handling algebraic properties in automatic analysis of security protocols
ICTAC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computing
Integrating automated and interactive protocol verification
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
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We present a static analysis technique for the verification of cryptographic protocols, specified in a process calculus. Rather than assuming a specific, fixed set of cryptographic primitives, we only require them to be specified through a term rewriting system, with no restrictions. Examples are provided to support our analysis. First, we tackle forward secrecy for a Diffie-Hellman-based protocol involving exponentiation, multiplication and inversion. Then, a simplified version of Kerberos is analyzed, showing that its use of timestamps succeeds in preventing replay attacks.