Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Symposium on Logic in computer science
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
MMM-ACNS '01 Proceedings of the International Workshop on Information Assurance in Computer Networks: Methods, Models, and Architectures for Network Security
A Bound on Attacks on Authentication Protocols
TCS '02 Proceedings of the IFIP 17th World Computer Congress - TC1 Stream / 2nd IFIP International Conference on Theoretical Computer Science: Foundations of Information Technology in the Era of Networking and Mobile Computing
Protocol Independence through Disjoint Encryption
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Proceedings of the 6th ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Cryptographic Protocol Composition via the Authentication Tests
FOSSACS '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures: Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2009
Specifying model changes with UMLchange to support security verification of potential evolution
Computer Standards & Interfaces
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
The composition of processes is in general not secrecy preserving under the Dolev-Yao attacker model. In this paper, we describe an algorithmic decision procedure which determines whether the composition of secrecy preserving processes is still secrecy preserving. As a case-study we consider a variant of the TLS protocol where, even though the client and server considered separately would be viewed as preserving the secrecy of the data to be communicated, its composition to the complete protocol does not preserve that secrecy. We also show results on tool support that allows one to validate the efficiency of our algorithm for multiple compositions.