The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Reasoning about knowledge and probability
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Secure implementation of channel abstractions
Information and Computation
The Logic of Authentication Protocols
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
Practical Quantum Oblivious Transfer
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Constructing Finite State Implementations of Knowledge-Based Programs with Perfect Recall
PRICAI '96 Proceedings from the Workshop on Intelligent Agent Systems, Theoretical and Practical Issues
A HOL extension of GNY for automatically analyzing cryptographic protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
A Compositional Logic for Protocol Correctness
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A compositional logic for proving security properties of protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW14
Symbolic Model Checking the Knowledge of the Dining Cryptographers
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Relating Symbolic and Cryptographic Secrecy
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems
Journal of Computer Security
Protocol Composition Logic (PCL)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
Journal of Cryptology
Computationally sound symbolic secrecy in the presence of hash functions
FSTTCS'06 Proceedings of the 26th international conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
Cryptographically sound implementations for communicating processes
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
Time-bounded task-PIOAs: a framework for analyzing security protocols
DISC'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Distributed Computing
Computationally sound, automated proofs for security protocols
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Computational secrecy by typing for the pi calculus
APLAS'06 Proceedings of the 4th Asian conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Knowledge forgetting: Properties and applications
Artificial Intelligence
Abstraction for epistemic model checking of dining cryptographers-based protocols
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Anonymity, Privacy, Onymity, and Identity: A Modal Logic Approach
Transactions on Data Privacy
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We introduce (i) a general class of security protocols with private channel as cryptographic primitive and (ii) a probabilistic epistemic logic to express properties of security protocols. Our main theorem says that when a property expressed in our logic holds for an ideal protocol (where "ideal" means that the private channel hides everything), then it also holds when the private channel is implemented using an encryption scheme that guarantees perfect secrecy (in the sense of Shannon). Our class of protocols contains, for instance, an oblivious transfer protocol by Rivest and Chaum's solution to the dining cryptographers problem. In our logic we can express fundamental security properties of these protocols. The proof of the main theorem is based on a notion of refinement for probabilistic Kripke structures.