A calculus of mobile processes, I
Information and Computation
On reduction-based process semantics
Selected papers of the thirteenth conference on Foundations of software technology and theoretical computer science
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
On asynchrony in name-passing calculi
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science
Theoretical Computer Science - Special issue: Foundations of wide area network computing
Secrecy types for a simulatable cryptographic library
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure Implementations for Typed Session Abstractions
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Cryptographically sound implementations for typed information-flow security
Proceedings of the 35th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Language Based Secure Communication
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Cryptographically sound implementations for communicating processes
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
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Process algebraic specifications of distributed systems are increasingly being targeted at identifying security primitives well-suited as high-level programming abstractions, and at the same time adequate for security analysis and verification. Drawing on our earlier work along these lines [Bugliesi, M. and R. Focardi, Language based secure communication, in: Proceedings of the 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2008, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 23-25 June 2008 (2008), pp. 3-16], we investigate the expressive power of a core set of security and network abstractions that provide high-level primitives for the specifications of the honest principals in a network as well as the lower-level adversarial primitives that must be assumed available to an attacker. We analyze various bisimulation equivalences for security, arising from endowing the intruder with (i) different adversarial capabilities and (ii) increasingly powerful control on the interaction among the distributed principals of a network. By comparing the relative strength of the bimimulation equivalences we obtain a direct measure of the discriminating power of the intruders, hence of the expressiveness of the corresponding models.