Black-box construction of a non-malleable encryption scheme from any semantically secure one

  • Authors:
  • Seung Geol Choi;Dana Dachman-Soled;Tal Malkin;Hoeteck Wee

  • Affiliations:
  • Columbia University;Columbia University;Columbia University;Columbia University

  • Venue:
  • TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We show how to transform any semantically secure encryption scheme into a non-malleable one, with a black-box construction that achieves a quasi-linear blow-up in the size of the ciphertext. This improves upon the previous non-black-box construction of Pass, Shelat and Vaikuntanathan (Crypto '06). Our construction also extends readily to guarantee non-malleability under a bounded-CCA2 attack, thereby simultaneously improving on both results in the work of Cramer et al. (Asiacrypt '07). Our construction departs from the oft-used paradigm of re-encrypting the same message with different keys and then proving consistency of encryptions; instead, we encrypt an encoding of the message with certain locally testable and self-correcting properties. We exploit the fact that low-degree polynomials are simultaneously good error-correcting codes and a secret-sharing scheme.