Black-box construction of a more than non-malleable CCA1 encryption scheme from plaintext awareness

  • Authors:
  • Steven Myers;Mona Sergi;abhi shelat

  • Affiliations:
  • Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA. E-mail: samyers@indiana.edu;University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA. E-mails: {ms4bf, abhi}@virginia.edu;University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA. E-mails: {ms4bf, abhi}@virginia.edu

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Computer Security - Advances in Security for Communication Networks
  • Year:
  • 2013

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Abstract

We construct a Non-Malleable Chosen Ciphertext Attack NM-CCA1 encryption scheme from any encryption scheme that is also plaintext aware and weakly simulatable. We believe this is the first construction of a NM-CCA1 scheme that follows strictly from encryption schemes with seemingly weaker or incomparable security definitions to NM-CCA1.Previously, the statistical Plaintext Awareness #1 PA1 notion was only known to imply CCA1. Our result is therefore novel because unlike the case of Chosen Plaintext Attack CPA and Chosen Chiphertext Attack CCA2, it is unknown whether a CCA1 scheme can be transformed into an NM-CCA1 scheme. Additionally, we show both the Damgård Elgamal Scheme DEG [in: CRYPTO, J. Feigenbaum, ed., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 576, Springer, 1991, pp. 445--456] and the Cramer--Shoup Lite Scheme CS-Lite [SIAM J. Comput. 331 2003, 167--226] are weakly simulatable under the DDH assumption. Since both are known to be statistical Plaintext Aware 1 PA1 under the Diffie--Hellman Knowledge DHK assumption, they instantiate our scheme securely.Furthermore, in response to a question posed by Matsuda and Matsuura [in: Public Key Cryptography, D. Catalano, N. Fazio, R. Gennaro and A. Nicolosi, eds, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6571, Springer, 2011, pp. 246--264], we define cNM-CCA1-security in which an NM-CCA1-adversary is permitted to ask a c≥1 number of parallel queries after receiving the challenge ciphertext. We extend our construction to yield a cNM-CCA1 scheme for any constant c. All of our constructions are black-box.