How to construct random functions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On the (non)Universality of the One-Time Pad
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On the Impossibility of Private Key Cryptography with Weakly Random Keys
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Authenticated Encryption: Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic Composition Paradigm
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On the (Im)possibility of Cryptography with Imperfect Randomness
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A model and architecture for pseudo-random generation with applications to /dev/random
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Characterization of Security Notions for Probabilistic Private-Key Encryption
Journal of Cryptology
Introduction to Modern Cryptography (Chapman & Hall/Crc Cryptography and Network Security Series)
Introduction to Modern Cryptography (Chapman & Hall/Crc Cryptography and Network Security Series)
Does privacy require true randomness?
TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
Forward-security in private-key cryptography
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Hedged Public-Key Encryption: How to Protect against Bad Randomness
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Randomness leakage in the KEM/DEM framework
ProvSec'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Provable security
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Chosen-plaintext attacks on private-key encryption schemes are currently modeled by giving an adversary access to an oracle that encrypts a given message musing random coins that are generated uniformly at randomand independentlyof anything else. This leaves open the possibility of attacks in case the random coins are poorly generated (e.g., using a faulty random number generator), or are under partial adversarial control (e.g., when encryption is done by lightweight devices that may be captured and tampered with).We introduce new notions of security modeling such attacks, propose two concrete schemes meeting our definitions, and show generic transformations for achieving security in this context.