How to Encrypt with a Malicious Random Number Generator
Fast Software Encryption
Non-malleable extractors and symmetric key cryptography from weak secrets
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Hedged Public-Key Encryption: How to Protect against Bad Randomness
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Does privacy require true randomness?
TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
Obtaining universally compoable security: towards the bare bones of trust
ASIACRYPT'07 Proceedings of the Advances in Crypotology 13th international conference on Theory and application of cryptology and information security
On the security of pseudorandomized information-theoretically secure schemes
ICITS'09 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Information theoretic security
On the impossibility of extracting classical randomness using a quantum computer
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
Distributed computing with imperfect randomness
DISC'05 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Distributed Computing
Separating sources for encryption and secret sharing
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Resettable cryptography in constant rounds --- the case of zero knowledge
ASIACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
ICITS'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Theoretic Security
On significance of the least significant bits for differential privacy
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Public-Key encryption with lazy parties
SCN'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
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We investigate the feasibility of a variety of cryptographic tasks with imperfect randomness. The kind of imperfect randomness we consider are entropy sources, such as those considered by Santha and Vazirani, Chor and Goldreich, and Zuckerman. We show the following: Certain cryptographic tasks like bit commitment, encryption, secret sharing, zero-knowledge, noninteractive zero-knowledge, and secure two-party computation for any non-trivial function are impossible to realize if parties have access to entropy sources with slightly less-than-perfect entropy, i.e., sources with imperfect randomness. These results are unconditional and do not rely on any unproven assumption. On the other hand, based on stronger variants of standard assumptions, secure signature schemes are possible with imperfect entropy sources. As another positive result, we show (without any unproven assumption) that interactive proofs can be made sound with respect to imperfect entropy sources.