The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
RSA-OAEP Is Secure under the RSA Assumption
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
New covert channels in HTTP: adding unwitting Web browsers to anonymity sets
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Efficient anonymity-preserving data collection
Proceedings of the 12th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Dummy traffic against long term intersection attacks
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
A characterization of online browsing behavior
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World wide web
Sampled traffic analysis by internet-exchange-level adversaries
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Evading censorship with browser-based proxies
PETS'12 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Dissent in numbers: making strong anonymity scale
OSDI'12 Proceedings of the 10th USENIX conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementation
Conscript your friends into larger anonymity sets with JavaScript
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
Proactively accountable anonymous messaging in verdict
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
Conscript your friends into larger anonymity sets with JavaScript
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We present the design and prototype implementation of ConScript, a framework for using JavaScript to encourage casual Web users to participate in an anonymous communication system. When a Web user visits a cooperative Web site, the site serves a JavaScript application that instructs the browser to create and submit "dummy" messages into the anonymity system. Users who want to send non-dummy messages through the anonymity system use a browser plug-in to replace these dummy messages with real messages. Creating such conscripted anonymity sets can increase the anonymity set size available to users of remailer, e-voting, and verifiable shuffle-style anonymity systems. We outline ConScript's architecture, we address a number of potential attacks against ConScript, and we discuss the ethical issues related to deploying such a system. Our implementation results demonstrate the practicality of ConScript: a workstation running our prototype ConScript JavaScript client generates a dummy message for a mix-net in 81 milliseconds and it generates a dummy message for a DoS-resistant DC-net in 156 milliseconds.