The notion of security for probabilistic cryptosystems
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
Information Processing Letters
Provably secure session key distribution: the three party case
STOC '95 Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: message authentication
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
SIAM Journal on Computing
Formal Eavesdropping and Its Computational Interpretation
TACS '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Entity Authentication and Key Distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
Journal of Cryptology
Completeness theorems for the Abadi-Rogaway language of encrypted expressions
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'02
Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Public-key encryption in a multi-user setting: security proofs and improvements
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Cryptographically sound security proofs for basic and public-key kerberos
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Computationally secure two-round authenticated message exchange
ASIACCS '10 Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy
Journal of Computer Security
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The Needham Schroeder protocol and its repaired verdion due to Lowe are the main test cases used by symbolic methods for cryptographic protocol analysis. In this paper we proved the first computational analysis of the protocol. We start by translating Lowe's attack against the orginal protocol into the computational framework that we use in our analysis. Then we prove that the repaired protocol may not be secure. even when the encryption scheme that is used in its implementation satisfies indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack, This shows that symbolic security analysis is not sound for protocols that use this kind of encryption. Our main result is to prove that the Needham-schroeder-Lowe protocol is secure if it is Implemented with an encryption scheme that satisfies the stronger notion of indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attack.