Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Practical Public Key Cryptosystem Provably Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Towards Practical Public Key Systems Secure Against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
The cramer-shoup encryption scheme is plaintext aware in the standard model
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Cramer-Shoup Satisfies a Stronger Plaintext Awareness under a Weaker Assumption
SCN '08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Strong knowledge extractors for public-key encryption schemes
ACISP'10 Proceedings of the 15th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
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Recently, Bellare and Palacio defined the plaintext awareness (PA-ness) in the standard model. In this paper, we study the relationship between the standard model PA-ness and the property about message hiding, that is, IND-CPA. Although these two notions seem to be independent at first glance, we show that PA-ness in the standard model implies the IND-CPA security if the encryption function is oneway. By using this result, we also showed that “PA + Oneway → IND-CCA2.” We also show that the computational PA-ness notion is strictly stronger than the statistical one.