How to construct random functions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An optimal class of symmetric key generation systems
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
STOC '91 Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Complete characterization of security notions for probabilistic private-key encryption
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Efficient, DoS-resistant, secure key exchange for internet protocols
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Perfectly-Secure Key Distribution for Dynamic Conferences
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Practical Public Key Cryptosystem Provably Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy
International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems
Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Brief announcement: secret handshakes from CA-oblivious encryption
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
k-anonymous secret handshakes with reusable credentials
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Brief announcement: a flexible framework for secret handshakes
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
K-anonymous multi-party secret handshakes
FC'07/USEC'07 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Financial cryptography and 1st International conference on Usable Security
Authentication for paranoids: multi-party secret handshakes
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
K-anonymous multi-party secret handshakes
FC'07/USEC'07 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Financial cryptography and 1st International conference on Usable Security
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Anonymity-protection techniques are crucial for various commercial and financial transactions, where participants are worried about their privacy. On the other hand, authentication methods are also crucial for such interactions. Secret handshake is a relatively recent mechanism that facilitates privacy-preserving mutual authentication between communicating peers. In recent years, researchers have proposed a set of secret handshake schemes based on different assumptions about the credentials used: from one-time credentials to the more general PKI-like credentials. In this paper, we concentrate on k-anonymous secret handshake schemes based on PKI-like infrastructures. More specifically, we deal with the k- anonymous m-party (m 2) secret handshake problem, which is significantly more involved than its two-party counterpart due to the following: When an honest user hand-shakes with m- 1 parties, it must be assured that these parties are distinct; otherwise, under the mask of anonymity a dishonest participant may clone itself in a single handshake session (i.e., assuming multiple personalities).