NTRUCCA: how to strengthen NTRUEncrypt to chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model

  • Authors:
  • Ron Steinfeld;San Ling;Josef Pieprzyk;Christophe Tartary;Huaxiong Wang

  • Affiliations:
  • Clayton School of Information Technology, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia;Div. of Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;Centre for Advanced Computing - Algorithms and Cryptography, Dept. of Computing, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia;Institute for Theoretical Computer Science, Tsinghua University, People's Republic of China;Div. of Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

  • Venue:
  • PKC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

NTRUEncrypt is a fast and practical lattice-based public-key encryption scheme, which has been standardized by IEEE, but until recently, its security analysis relied only on heuristic arguments. Recently, Stehlé and Steinfeld showed that a slight variant (that we call pNE ) could be proven to be secure under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA), assuming the hardness of worst-case problems in ideal lattices. We present a variant of pNE called NTRUCCA , that is IND-CCA2 secure in the standard model assuming the hardness of worst-case problems in ideal lattices, and only incurs a constant factor overhead in ciphertext and key length over the pNE scheme. To our knowledge, our result gives the first IND-CCA2 secure variant of NTRUEncrypt in the standard model, based on standard cryptographic assumptions. As an intermediate step, we present a construction for an All-But-One (ABO) lossy trapdoor function from pNE , which may be of independent interest. Our scheme uses the lossy trapdoor function framework of Peikert and Waters, which we generalize to the case of (k −1)-of-k -correlated input distributions.