Operating system concepts (3rd ed.)
Operating system concepts (3rd ed.)
Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks
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STOC '91 Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
RSA security's official guide to cryptography
RSA security's official guide to cryptography
Secure Length-Saving ElGamal Encryption under the Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
ACISP '00 Proceedings of the 5th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
REACT: Rapid Enhanced-Security Asymmetric Cryptosystem Transform
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
On the Power of Misbehaving Adversaries and Security Analysis of the Original EPOC
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Forward-Secure Signatures with Optimal Signing and Verifying
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Practical Public Key Cryptosystem Provably Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Secure Integration of Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security of Signed ElGamal Encryption
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
On the Security of ElGamal Based Encryption
PKC '98 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
How to Enhance the Security of Public-Key Encryption at Minimum Cost
PKC '99 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
Chosen-Ciphertext Security for Any One-Way Cryptosystem
PKC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
A method for secure and efficient block cipher using white-box cryptography
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication
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This paper presents a new type of powerful cryptanalytic attacks on public-key cryptosystems, extending the more commonly studied adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. In the new attacks, an adversary is not only allowed to submit to a decryption oracle (valid or invalid) ciphertexts of her choice, but also to emit a "dump query" prior to the completion of a decryption operation. The dump query returns intermediate results that have not been erased in the course of the decryption operation, whereby allowing the adversary to gain vital advantages in breaking the cryptosystem. We believe that the new attack model approximates more closely existing security systems. We examine its power by demonstrating that most existing public-key cryptosystems, including OAEP-RSA, are vulnerable to our extended attacks.