Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
SIAM Journal on Computing
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Chosen-Ciphertext security from tag-based encryption
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Simple CCA-Secure Public Key Encryption from Any Non-Malleable Identity-Based Encryption
Information Security and Cryptology --- ICISC 2008
Adaptive-ID Secure Revocable Identity-Based Encryption
CT-RSA '09 Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2009 on Topics in Cryptology
Relations between semantic security and anonymity in identity-based encryption
Information Processing Letters
On the conventional public key in identification-based encryption: the case of RSA
International Journal of Information and Computer Security
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Identity-based encryption has attracted a lot of attention since the publication of the scheme by Boneh and Franklin. In this work we compare the two adversarial models previously considered in the literature, namely the full and selective-identity models. Remarkably, we show that the strongest security level with respect to selective-identity attacks (i.e. chosen-ciphertext security) fails to imply the weakest full-identity security level (i.e. one-wayness). In addition, an analogous result for the related primitive of tag-based encryption is presented.