A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Security of Blind Discrete Log Signatures against Interactive Attacks
ICICS '01 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security of Signed ElGamal Encryption
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
The Exact Security of ECIES in the Generic Group Model
Proceedings of the 8th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding
Proof-assistants using dependent type systems
Handbook of automated reasoning
Journal of Functional Programming
Lower bounds for discrete logarithms and related problems
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Why provable security matters?
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Machine-checked security proofs of cryptographic signature schemes
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Towards automated proofs for asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A framework for game-based security proofs
ICICS'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information and communications security
Automated Proofs for Asymmetric Encryption
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Automated proofs for asymmetric encryption
Concurrency, Compositionality, and Correctness
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Most approaches to the formal analysis of cryptography protocols make the perfect cryptographic assumption, which entails for example that there is no way to obtain knowledge about the plaintext pertaining to a ciphertext without knowing the key. Ideally, one would prefer to abandon the perfect cryptography hypothesis and reason about the computational cost of breaking a cryptographic scheme by achieving such goals as gaining information about the plaintext pertaining to a ciphertext without knowing the key. Such a view is permitted by non-standard computational models such as the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model. Using the proof assistant Coq, we provide a machine-checked account of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model. We exploit this framework to prove the security of the ElGamal cryptosystem against adaptive chosen ciphertexts attacks.