The Analysis of Zheng-Seberry Scheme
ACISP '02 Proceedings of the 7th Australian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
REACT: Rapid Enhanced-Security Asymmetric Cryptosystem Transform
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Chosen-Ciphertext Security for Any One-Way Cryptosystem
PKC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Computationally Sound Compositional Logic for Key Exchange Protocols
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Formal certification of code-based cryptographic proofs
Proceedings of the 36th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A probabilistic hoare-style logic for game-based cryptographic proofs
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
A machine-checked formalization of the random oracle model
TYPES'04 Proceedings of the 2004 international conference on Types for Proofs and Programs
Machine-checked security proofs of cryptographic signature schemes
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Automated security proofs with sequences of games
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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Many generic constructions for building secure cryptosystems from primitives with lower level of security have been proposed. Providing security proofs has also become standard practice. There is, however, a lack of automated verification procedures that analyze such cryptosystems and provide security proofs. In this paper, we present a sound and automated procedure that allows us to verify that a generic asymmetric encryption scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks in the random oracle model. It has been applied to several examples of encryption schemes among which the construction of Bellare---Rogaway 1993, of Pointcheval at PKC'2000.