How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Security of Blind Discrete Log Signatures against Interactive Attacks
ICICS '01 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Open Issues in Formal Methods for Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
MMM-ACNS '01 Proceedings of the International Workshop on Information Assurance in Computer Networks: Methods, Models, and Architectures for Network Security
Security of Signed ElGamal Encryption
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
TCS '00 Proceedings of the International Conference IFIP on Theoretical Computer Science, Exploring New Frontiers of Theoretical Informatics
Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Equivalence and Security Analysis
FM '99 Proceedings of the Wold Congress on Formal Methods in the Development of Computing Systems-Volume I - Volume I
The Exact Security of ECIES in the Generic Group Model
Proceedings of the 8th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding
Proof-assistants using dependent type systems
Handbook of automated reasoning
A Linguistic Characterization of Bounded Oracle Computation and Probabilistic Polynomial Time
FOCS '98 Proceedings of the 39th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Lower bounds for discrete logarithms and related problems
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Why provable security matters?
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Towards automated proofs for asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Formal proof of provable security by game-playing in a proof assistant
ProvSec'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Provable security
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Automated Proofs for Asymmetric Encryption
Journal of Automated Reasoning
A probabilistic hoare-style logic for game-based cryptographic proofs
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
A machine-checked formalization of the random oracle model
TYPES'04 Proceedings of the 2004 international conference on Types for Proofs and Programs
Automated security proofs with sequences of games
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Automated proofs for asymmetric encryption
Concurrency, Compositionality, and Correctness
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Formal methods have been extensively applied to the certification of cryptographic protocols. However, most of these works make the perfect cryptography assumption, i.e. the hypothesis that there is no way to obtain knowledge about the plaintext pertaining to a ciphertext without knowing the key. A model that does not require the perfect cryptography assumption is the generic model and the random oracle model. These models provide non-standard computational models in which one may reason about the computational cost of breaking a cryptographic scheme. Using the machine-checked account of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model formalized in Coq, we prove the safety of cryptosystems that depend on a cyclic group (like ElGamal cryptosystem), against interactive generic attacks and we prove the security of blind signatures against interactive attacks. To prove the last step, we use a generic parallel attack to create a forgery signature.