Automated proofs for asymmetric encryption

  • Authors:
  • Joudicaël Courant;Marion Daubignard;Cristian Ene;Pascal Lafourcade;Yassine Lakhnech

  • Affiliations:
  • Université Grenoble 1, CNRS,Verimag;Université Grenoble 1, CNRS,Verimag;Université Grenoble 1, CNRS,Verimag;Université Grenoble 1, CNRS,Verimag;Université Grenoble 1, CNRS,Verimag

  • Venue:
  • Concurrency, Compositionality, and Correctness
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Chosen-ciphertext security is by now a standard security property for asymmetric encryption. Many generic constructions for building secure cryptosystems from primitives with lower level of security have been proposed. Providing security proofs has also become standard practice. There is, however, a lack of automated verification procedures that analyze such cryptosystems and provide security proofs. This paper presents an automated procedure for analyzing generic asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model. It has been applied to several examples of encryption schemes among which the construction of Bellare-Rogaway 1993, of Pointcheval at PKC'2000 and REACT.