A rational approach to cryptographic protocols

Authors:
P. Caballero-Gil;C. HenáNdez-Goya;C. Bruno-CastañEda
Affiliations:
Department of Statistics, Operations Research and Computing, Faculty of Mathematics, University of La Laguna, 38271 Tenerife, Spain;Department of Statistics, Operations Research and Computing, Faculty of Mathematics, University of La Laguna, 38271 Tenerife, Spain;Department of Statistics, Operations Research and Computing, Faculty of Mathematics, University of La Laguna, 38271 Tenerife, Spain
Venue:
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Year:
2007

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Abstract

This work initiates an analysis of several cryptographic protocols from a rational point of view using a game-theoretical approach, which allows us to represent not only the protocols but also possible misbehaviours of parties. Concretely, several concepts of two-person games and of two-party cryptographic protocols are here combined in order to model the latter as the former. One of the main advantages of analysing a cryptographic protocol in the game-theory setting is the possibility of describing improved and stronger cryptographic solutions because possible adversarial behaviours may be taken into account directly. With those tools, protocols can be studied in a malicious model in order to find equilibrium conditions that make possible to protect honest parties against all possible strategies of adversaries.