Optimistic protocols for fair exchange
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The Dynamics of the Electronic Market: An Evolutionary Game Approach
Information Systems Frontiers
Making trust explicit in distributed commerce transactions
ICDCS '96 Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS '96)
Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents
Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents
Equilibrium analysis of the possibilities of unenforced exchange in multiagent systems
IJCAI'95 Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Ripping coins for a fair exchange
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Credit risk management system on e-Commerce: case based reasoning approach
ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
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IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
A new dependable exchange protocol
Computer Communications
Building reliable mix networks with fair exchange
ACNS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
A rational approach to cryptographic protocols
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Risk balance in optimistic non-repudiation protocols
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
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Safe exchange is a key issue in multiagent systems, especially in electronic transactions where nondelivery is a major problem. In this paper we present a unified framework for modeling safe exchange mechanisms. It captures the disparate earlier approaches as well as new safe exchange mechanisms (e.g., reputation, locking). Being an overarching framework, it also allows us to study what is inherently possible and impossible in safe exchange. We study this under different game-theoretic solution concepts, with and without a trusted third party, and with an offline third party that only gets involved if the exchange fails. The results vary based on the generality of the exchange setting, the existence (or creative construction) of special types of items to be exchanged, and the magnitude of transfer costs, defection costs, and escrow fees. Finally, we present an incentive-compatible negotiation protocol for selecting the best safe exchange mechanism when the agents do not know each others' costs for the different alternatives.