Fair exchange with a semi-trusted third party (extended abstract)
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Fairness in electronic commerce
Fairness in electronic commerce
(Im)possibility of safe exchange mechanism design
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Simple and fast optimistic protocols for fair electronic exchange
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
ExchangeGuard: A Distributed Protocol for Electronic Fair-Exchange
IPDPS '05 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS'05) - Papers - Volume 01
On the security of fair non-repudiation protocols
International Journal of Information Security - Special issue on SC 2003
An anonymous and failure resilient fair-exchange e-commerce protocol
Decision Support Systems
A formal model of rational exchange and its application to the analysis of Syverson's protocol
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Risk balance in exchange protocols
ASIAN'07 Proceedings of the 12th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: computer and network security
An evenhanded certified email system for contract signing
ICICS'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information and Communications Security
On the security of public key protocols
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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We investigate how the behaviors of malicious trusted parties affect participants of optimistic non-repudiation protocols. We introduce a notion of risk balance for exchange protocols. Intuitively, risk balance refers to fairness in the amount of protection a protocol offers to the participants against malicious trustees. We explore how risk balance relates to the notions of accountable trustees and transparent trustees previously introduced by Asokan and Micali, respectively. As a case study, we investigate the consequences of malicious behaviors of trusted parties in the context of two fair non-repudiation protocols, proposed by Gürgens, Rudolph and Vogt (2005). We discover a number of security issues in these protocols and propose simple solutions for fixing them.