Risk balance in exchange protocols

Authors:
Mohammad Torabi Dashti;Yanjing Wang
Affiliations:
CWI, Amsterdam;CWI, Amsterdam
Venue:
ASIAN'07 Proceedings of the 12th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: computer and network security
Year:
2007

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Abstract

We study the behaviour of rational agents in exchange protocols which rely on trustees. We allow malicious parties to compromise the trustee by paying a cost and, thereby, present a game analysis that advocates exchange protocols which induce balanced risks on the participants. We also present a risk-balanced protocol for fair confidential secret comparison.