AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bidding optimally in concurrent second-price auctions of perfectly substitutable goods
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Outperforming the competition in multi-unit sealed bid auctions
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Valuation uncertainty and imperfect introspection in second-price auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Bidding strategies for realistic multi-unit sealed-bid auctions
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Market-based control of computational systems: introduction to the special issue
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Designing trading agents for real-world auctions
SETN'10 Proceedings of the 6th Hellenic conference on Artificial Intelligence: theories, models and applications
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When autonomous agents decide on their bidding strategies in real world auctions, they have a number of concerns that go beyond the models that are normally analyzed in traditional auction theory. Oftentimes, the agents have budget constraints and the auctions have a reserve price, both of which restrict the bids the agents can place. In addition, their attitude need not be risk-neutral and they may have uncertainty about the value of the goods they are buying. Some of these issues have been examined individually for single-unit sealed-bid auctions. However, in this paper, we extend this analysis to the multi-unit case, and also analyze the multi-unit sealed-bid auctions in which a combination of these issues are present, for unit-demand bidders. This analysis constitutes the main contribution of this paper. We then demonstrate the usefulness in practice of this analysis; we show in simulations that taking into account all these issues allows the bidders to maximize their utility. Furthermore, using this analysis allows a seller to improve her revenue, i.e. by selecting the optimal reserve price and auction format.