The Role and the Impact of Preferences on Multiagent Interaction
ATAL '99 6th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VI, Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL),
Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Generating Bayes-Nash equilibria to design autonomous trading agents
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Towards agents participating in realistic multi-unit sealed-bid auctions
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Bidding strategies for realistic multi-unit sealed-bid auctions
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Bidding strategies for realistic multi-unit sealed-bid auctions
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Designing trading agents for real-world auctions
SETN'10 Proceedings of the 6th Hellenic conference on Artificial Intelligence: theories, models and applications
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In this paper, we examine the behavior of bidding agents that are in direct competition with the other participants in an auction setting. Thus the agents are not simply trying to maximize their own utility, rather they wish to maximize a weighted difference of their own gain to that of their competitors. By so doing, this work significantly extends the existing state-of-the-art results on single unit auctions, by generalizing to the multi-unit case. Specifically, our main result is the derivation of symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria for these agents in both mth and (m + 1)th price sealed bid auctions. Subsequently, we use these equilibria to examine the profits of different agents and show that aiming to beat the competition is more effective than pure self interest in any competitive setting. Finally, we examine how the auctioneer's revenue is affected and find that the weight that agents place in minimizing the opponents' profit determines whether the mth or the (m + 1)th price auction yields a higher revenue.