Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
ATTac-2001: A Learning, Autonomous Bidding Agent
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
A principled study of the design tradeoffs for autonomous trading agents
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A principled methodology for the design of autonomous trading agents with combinatorial preferences in the presence of tradeoffs
Bayes-Nash equilibria for mth price auctions with multiple closing times
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Approximate strategic reasoning through hierarchical reduction of large symmetric games
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Bayes-Nash equilibria for mth price auctions with multiple closing times
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Outperforming the competition in multi-unit sealed bid auctions
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Designing trading agents for real-world auctions
SETN'10 Proceedings of the 6th Hellenic conference on Artificial Intelligence: theories, models and applications
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This paper presents a methodology for designing trading agents for complex games. We compute, for the first time, Bayes-Nash equilibria for first-price single-unit auctions and mth-price multiunit auctions, when the auction has a set of possible closing times, one of which is chosen randomly for the auction to end at. To evaluate this approach we used our analysis to generate strategies for the International Trading Agent Competition. One of these was evaluated as the best overall and was subsequently used very successfully by our agent WhiteBear in the 2005 competition.